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I.

INTRODUCTION

In our society, it is an article of faith, as well as of constitutional

law, that a judicial hearing must be fair to the parties involved, both
in its actual conduct and in its appearance. Today, many hearings on
public actions are conducted not by judges but by elected officials,
appointed boardmembers, administrative staff, and professional
adjudicators. The individual rights at issue in these actions are often
as important as those resolved in judicial courtrooms. Yet it has never
been clear whether we can hold nonjudicial adjudicators and their
proceedings to the same standards of fairness we expect from judges-and, if we should, how best to do so.
All states have codes of judicial conduct that unambiguously
require judges to maintain integrity and impartiality and to avoid
personal entanglements, both in actual judicial conduct and elsewhere,
in order to promote public confidence in the judiciary.' Judges must
disqualify themselves whenever they have bias or prejudice concerning
of disputed facts, or personal interest
parties, personal knowledge
2
connected to the matter.
All states guarantee constitutional due process and fairness for

both judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. They differ, however, on
the legal standard of fairness to apply to quasi-judicial proceedings.

Many states rely on due process guarantees, that is, a proceeding which
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is fair in actual substance and procedure.3 Washington, however, has
adopted more of the judicial standard for quasi-judicial actions,
requiring "a hearing not only fair in substance, but fair in appearance
as well." 4 This "appearance of fairness doctrine" was originally
developed within the context of local land use decisions? Later, it was
applied to a broader spectrum of administrative proceedings.6
Applying judicial standards to a diverse assortment of quasijudicial decision makers and proceedings has been fraught with
difficulties. Foremost is the fact that many local land use decisions are
made by legislative bodies, composed of elected officials who have
policy positions and personal contacts, creating a "conflict in values." 7
The Washington Legislature has exempted from the doctrine purely
legislative actions and some political activity, but the problem
persists.' What constitutes an appearance of unfairness is determined
through the eyes of a "reasonably prudent and disinterested observer.' This standard, however, leaves considerable uncertainty for the
decision makers and much discretion to the courts.
In recent years, Washington courts have exhibited an unwillingness to find violations of the appearance of fairness doctrine, even with
significant evidence of unfairness.10 At the same time, the statutory
3. See, e.g., Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs of Washington County, 507 P.2d 23, 30
(Or. 1973) ("[Parties at county board hearings] are entitled to an opportunity to be heard, to an
opportunity to present and rebut evidence, to a tribunal which is impartial in the matter-i.e.,
having had no prehearing or ex parte contacts concerning the question at issue-and to a record
made and adequate findings executed.").
4. Smith v. Skagit County, 75 Wash. 2d 715, 739, 453 P.2d 832, 846 (1969).
5. The major early cases include (in chronological order): Smith v. Skagit County, 75
Wash. 2d 715, 453 P.2d 832 (1969); Chrobuck v. Snohomish County, 78 Wash. 2d 858, 480 P.2d
489 (1971); Buell v. City of Bremerton, 80 Wash. 2d 518, 495 P.2d 1358 (1972); Fleming v. City
of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972); Narrowsview Preservation Ass'n v. City of
Tacoma, 84 Wash. 2d 416, 526 P.2d 897 (1974); Swift v. Island County, 87 Wash. 2d 348, 552
P.2d 175 (1976); SAVE v. City of Bothell, 89 Wash. 2d 862, 576 P.2d 401 (1978).
6. See, e.g., Chicago, Milwaukee, St. P. & Pac. R.R. v. Washington State Human Rights
Comm'n, 87 Wash. 2d 802, 557 P.2d 307 (1976) (employment discrimination); Washington Med.
Disciplinary Bd. v. Johnston, 99 Wash. 2d 466, 663 P.2d 457 (1983) (revocation of license to
practice medicine). In recent years, the appearance of fairness doctrine has often been invoked
in criminal and custody contexts against judicial and other court officers (e.g., prosecutors and
probation officers) for bias against a defendant. See State v. Ladenburg, 67 Wash. App. 749, 75355, 840 P.2d 228, 231-32 (1992). The focus in this Comment is on land use decision making and
related administrative proceedings.
7. Carolyn M. Van Noy, Comment, The Appearance of Fairness Doctrine: A Conflict in
Values, 61 WASH. L. REV. 533, 533 (1986).
8. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 42.36.020-.050 (1996).
9. Washington Med. DisciplinaryBd., 99 Wash. 2d at 478, 663 P.2d at 464 (1983).
10. See, e.g., Raynes v. City of Leavenworth, 118 Wash. 2d 237, 821 P.2d 1204 (1992);
Organization to Preserve Agric. Lands v. Adams County, 128 Wash. 2d 869, 913 P.2d 793
(1996).
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landscape for land use project review and approval has changed
dramatically, becoming more public and technical and resulting in
greater professional staff involvement and less discretion for legislative
bodies and planning commissions.1 1
Although the appearance of fairness doctrine is indisputably still
good law, the question today is whether courts will apply it. And, if
courts will not apply the doctrine, then the question is what procedural
standard applies to quasi-judicial decision makers and how that
standard fits within the framework of land use statutes enacted in
recent decades. To address this question, this Comment first traces
the evolution of the doctrine from its initial announcement by the court
to the most recent decisions. Part III then examines the enforcement
and ambiguity problems posed by the doctrine today. Part IV
evaluates whether the doctrine has become increasingly irrelevant
because of the ever-expanding procedural protections in statutes
governing land use decision making.
The conclusion from this analysis is that this emergent statutory
scheme has greatly increased public participation in, and scrutiny of,
land use project proposals, has reduced the role of the legislative bodies
to which the original doctrine was addressed, and has given much more
decision-making authority to professional staff and adjudicators. A
further consequence of this statutory supplantation has been a judicial
modification of the doctrine, transforming the doctrine's standard into
an approximation of constitutional due process. As a result, today's
courts are unlikely to invoke the appearance of fairness doctrine to
protect the public interest even though violations of the doctrine still
can and do occur, and the doctrine has been relegated to an inactive
status as a relic of the needs of an earlier generation.
EVOLUTION OF THE APPEARANCE OF FAIRNESS DOCTRINE
The roots of the appearance of fairness doctrine extend well back
into Washington's history, but its modern incarnation began with a
court decision in 1969 and developed rapidly for more than a decade
until the legislature limited its scope. Since then, despite numerous
actions invoking the doctrine, the court has not invalidated a single
II.

11. See, e.g., Washington Environmental Policy Act (1971), WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C
(1996); Shoreline Management Act (1971), WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58 (1996); Growth
Management Act (1990), WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A (1996); Local Project Review Act (1995),
WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70B (1996); Land Use Petition Act (1995), WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70C
(1996).
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land use decision on violation of it. This part summarizes this ascent
and decline of Washington's appearance of fairness doctrine.
A. Roots of the Doctrine
"The principle of impartiality, disinterestedness, and fairness on
the part of the judge is as old as the history of courts. 11 2 So stated
the court in the first Washington case where the judicial apparent
fairness standard to a quasi-judicial administrative board was applied.
The doctrine has roots in both common law and constitutional due
process applied to administrative decision makers.13 The early courts
seemed to assume a constitutional basis for apparent fairness as a
component of due process, probably because the doctrine derived from
the Judicial Code.' 4 The court ultimately disavowed a constitutional
basis for the doctrine, which then permitted the legislature to curtail
it.15
B. Doctrinal Development
The seminal decision came in 1969 in a case involving the
rezoning of island property for heavy industrial use. 6 Smith v. Skagit
County set the framework from which the doctrine developed.' 7 The
Smith rule had three components governing public actions: first, if a
public hearing is required by law, it must be fair in appearance as well
as in substance;'" second, the standard applies to both legislative and

12. State ex rel. Barnard v. Board of Educ., 19 Wash. 8, 17, 52 P. 317, 320 (1898).
13. James M. Vache, Appearance of Fairness: Doctrine or Delusion? 13 WILLAMETTE L.J.
479, 480 (1977).
14. See State ex rel. Beam v. Fulwiler, 76 Wash. 2d 313, 315-16 (1969) (quoting In re
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) "every procedure which would offer a possible temptation
to the average man as a judge ... not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State
and the accused, denies the latter due process of law").
15. See City of Bellevue v. King County Boundary Review Bd., 90 Wash. 2d 856, 863, 586
P.2d 470, 475 (1978).
16. Smith v. Skagit County, 75 Wash. 2d 715, 453 P.2d 832. Only months after the Skagit
County Board of County Commissioners adopted a comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance
designating all of Guemes Island as Residential/Recreational, the county received a proposal to
rezone 700 acres and 7,000 waterfront feet of the island for an aluminum reduction plant. The
county planning commission, frustrated by a contentious public hearing, held a dosed session to
review the proposal, allowing only project proponents to attend. The planning commission then
approved the proposal. The commissioners approved the rezone in their first and only meeting
on the proposal, at which no public comments were permitted. The opposition, led by Seattle
attorney John Ehrlichman, appealed the decision to the courts on the novel theory of a necessity
for apparent fairness as well as actual fairness.
17. The appearance of fairness foundation in Smith, however, could be considered dictum
because the court invalidated the commission's action primarily on the basis of illegal spot zoning.
18. Smith, 75 Wash. 2d at 739-40, 453 P.2d at 846.
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quasi-judicial proceedings; 9 and third, the test for fairness is that the
hearing "must not only be open-minded and fair, but must have the
appearance of being so," based on the perspective of a fair-minded
person in attendance at all of the meetings on a given issue.2 °
The Smith court's reluctance to separate the legislative and quasijudicial functions of the county's governing body apparently led the
court beyond traditional due process, which arguably could have
sufficed for a quasi-judicial action.2 The court wrestled with the
distinction in subsequent cases. In Chrobuck v. Snohomish County, the
court determined that an appointed planning commission had quasijudicial functions in order to find appearance of fairness violations by
a member of the commission.2 2 In Fleming v. City of Tacoma, the
court distinguished between a legislative body's actions in adopting a
comprehensive plan or zoning code and in amending the code or
rezoning a property: the former is legislative, the latter is quasijudicial. 3 In Polygon Corp. v. City of Seattle, the court held that
purely administrative actions, where no public hearing was required,
were not subject to the doctrine. 4
In the land use context, virtually all of the appearance of fairness
violations have been by members of city councils, boards of county
Occasionally, the
commissioners, and planning commissions.2"

19. Id. at 740, 453 P.2d at 846.
20. Id. at 741, 453 P.2d at 847.
21. Vache, supra note 13, at 487. Legislative functions descend from the representative
political process, while quasi-judicial functions are variants of judicial hearings, subject to
constitutional due process for parties. By contrast, the Oregon court in its seminal Fasano
decision did differentiate the functions and has been able to stay with a due process standard.
Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs of Washington County, 507 P.2d 23, 29-30 (Or. 1973).
22. Chrobuck v. Snohomish County, 78 Wash. 2d 858, 869, 480 P.2d 489, 496 (1971).
23. Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 298-99, 502 P.2d 327, 331 (1972). The
court left this dichotomy in somewhat general language, a problem which was touched on, but
never completely resolved, in Byers v. Board of Clallam County Commr's., 84 Wash. 2d 796, 803,
529 P.2d 823, 829 (1974), and Westside Hilltop Survival Comm. v. King County, 96 Wash. 2d 171,
178, 634 P.2d 862, 865-66 (1981). This dichotomy was adopted and codified by the legislature
in title 42, chapter 36, section 010, of the Washington Revised Code.
24. Polygon Corp. v. City of Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d 59, 67-68, 578 P.2d 1309, 1314 (1978).
The court later modified this holding on statutorily required public hearings in Harris v.
Hornbaker, 98 Wash. 2d 650, 660, 658 P.2d 1219, 1223 (1983).
25. See, e.g., SAVE v. City of Bothell, 89 Wash. 2d 862, 576 P.2d 401 (1978); Swift v.
Island County, 87 Wash. 2d 348, 552 P.2d 175 (1976); Narrowsview Preservation Ass'n v. City
of Tacoma, 84 Wash. 2d 416, 526 P.2d 897 (1974); Anderson v. Island County, 81 Wash. 2d
312, 501 P.2d 594 (1972); Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972);
Buell v. City of Bremerton, 80 Wash. 2d 518, 495 P.2d 1358 (1972); Chrobuck v. Snohomish
County, 78 Wash. 2d 858, 480 P.2d 489 (1971); Smith v. Skagit County, 75 Wash. 2d 715, 453
P.2d 832 (1969).
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doctrine has been applied to quasi-judicial administrative actions
outside the context of land use decisions. In one case for example, the
court found a violation in an employment discrimination complaint to
the state human rights commission, because of personal interest by a
commission member.2 6 In another administrative area, the court did
not find a violation of the doctrine by members of the Washington
Medical Disciplinary Board for combined investigatory and adjudicatory functions. 21
The appearance of fairness doctrine parallels due process
requirements by mandating (1) public meeting notice and opportunity
to be heard, and (2) impartial decision makers. The first of these,
deficiencies in public meeting procedures, is the less frequent class of
violation. The actual appearance of fairness violation found in Smith
was flaws in the public hearings, especially the exclusion of opponents
from a closed meeting and insufficient opportunity for opposing
testimony. 28 Normally, cross-examination is not a feature of land use
hearings, but the Chrobuck court found the absence of cross-examination to be a violation of appearance of fairness.29 In another case, the
court suggested that sufficient meeting notice may also be a requirement of the doctrine.3 °
But most of the attention for the appearance of fairness doctrine
is on the impartiality of the public officials making the decision. The
Buell v. City of Bremerton court identified three elements of bias:
prejudgment of the issue, hostility or favoritism toward a party, and a

City council members and county commissioners are elected officials who constitute the
legislative body of their local governments. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 35A.12.010, 35A.13.010,
35.18.010, .160 (city councils); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.32.005, .120 (county commissions).
Members of planning commissions are usually appointed by the council or board of commissioners. They review planning, zoning, and project proposals and recommend an action to their
council or board. See WASH. REV. CODE § 35.63 (planning commissions), § 36.70 (planning
enabling act). Membership on planning commissions has traditionally been attractive to people
with interests in local land development and with local political ambitions.
26. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. P. & Pac. R.R. v. Washington State Human Rights Comm'n,
87 Wash. 2d 802, 810-11, 557 P.2d 303, 312-13 (1976). See also supra note 6.
27. Washington Med. Disciplinary Bd., 99 Wash. 2d at 479-80, 663 P.2d at 464-65.
28. Fleming, 81 Wash. 2d at 296, 502 P.2d at 329 ("In Smith we focused our attention upon
defects in the hearing itself rather than upon motives of the members who conducted the hearing
....
We were particularly disturbed by the planning commission's closed executive session to
which proponents were invited and opponents excluded, and by the county commissioners' refusal
to allow opponents to present their views on certain occasions.").
29. Chrobuck v. Snohomish County, 78 Wash. 2d 858, 870, 480 P.2d 489, 496 (1971).
30. Glaspey & Sons, Inc. v. Conrad, 83 Wash. 2d 707, 521 P.2d 1173 (1974), cited in
RICHARD L. SETTLE, WASHINGTON LAND USE AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PRACTICE

212 (1983).
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personal interest in the outcome of the decision.3 1 These are not
necessarily discrete elements: hostility or favoritism is likely to be
manifested as prejudgment of the case, while personal interests and
contacts can often be the basis for hostility or favoritism toward
parties." Verbal statements of prejudgment by decision makers,
violating appearance of fairness, have been linked to partiality33 and
personal interest.34 Personal interest has been the favorite basis for
finding violation: ownership of adjacent land,3" future employment
37
with a party,36 and current employment indirectly linked to a party
have been held to violate the proscription against biased decision
makers. Ex parte contacts, between one party 38and a decision maker,
are often a feature of all three elements of bias.
C.

Legislative Clarification

After the court's declaration that the appearance of fairness
doctrine was not constitutionally based,3 9 the Washington Legislature
acted in 1982 to limit and clarify the doctrine's application in local
The primary focus of the Appearance of
land use decisions.4"
Fairness Statute was the distinction between legislative and quasijudicial actions and the role of elected decision makers with respect to
appearance of fairness strictures.
Codifying the court's distinction in Fleming, the Appearance of
Fairness Statute expressly limits the doctrine's application in local land
use decisions to quasi-judicial actions of legislative bodies, planning
commissions, hearing examiners, and other boards which determine

31. 80 Wash. 2d at 524, 495 P.2d at 1362.
32. See SETTLE, supra note 30, at 212.
33. Anderson v. Island County, 81 Wash. 2d 312, 326-27, 501 P.2d 594, 602 (1972);
Chrobuck, 78 Wash. 2d at 869-70, 480 P.2d at 496 (1971).
34. Swift v. Island County, 87 Wash. 2d 348, 361-62, 552 P.2d 175, 183 (1976).
35. Buell, 80 Wash. 2d at 525, 495 P.2d at 1362-63.
36. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. P. & Pac. R.R., 87 Wash. 2d at 810-11, 557 P.2d at 312-13;
Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d at 300, 502 P.2d at 331-32.
37. SAVE v. City of Bothell, 89 Wash. 2d at 872-73, 576 P.2d at 407 (1978). See also
Swift v. Island County, 87 Wash. 2d 348, 552 P.2d 175 (1976); Narrowsview Preservation Ass'n
v. City of Tacoma, 84 Wash. 2d 416, 526 P.2d 897 (1974).
38. The Buell court may not have treated ex parte contacts as a distinct element, but the
legislature treated them separately in the Appearance of Fairness Statute. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 42.36.060.
39. City of Bellevue v. King County Boundary Review Bd., 90 Wash. 2d 856, 863, 586
P.2d 470, 475 (1978). However, the court did indicate that the doctrine was related to traditional
due process considerations, which are constitutionally based.
40. The Appearance of Fairness Statute, WASH. REV. CODE § 42.36 (1996).
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individual parties' rights.4' No legislative action, defined as adoption,
amendment, or revision of comprehensive plans and area-wide zoning
ordinances, can be invalidated by the appearance of fairness doctrine.42
Recognizing the political duties of elected decision makers, the
Legislature mandated that no appearance of fairness violation can be
found for conducting the business of the decision maker's office, or for
statements by candidates for public office or contributions to such
candidates.4 3 But, addressing an inevitable problem with elected
decision makers, the legislature prohibited ex parte communications by
decision makers during a quasi-judicial proceeding unless (1) the
contents are put in the hearing record, and (2) there is announcement
and opportunity for rebuttal at the hearing.4 4 A decision maker may
not be disqualified by prior participation in advisory proceedings on
the same issue.4 5
Challenges to decision makers' participation on appearance of
fairness grounds must be brought as soon as the challenger learns of
the grounds. 46 But, acknowledging the small size of many decisionmaking boards, such as county commissioners, the legislature permitted
full participation by a disqualified decision maker under the doctrine
of necessity if nonparticipation would destroy a quorum.4 7
Finally, in a couple of intentional swipes at the judicial doctrine
itself,4" the Legislature declared first that nothing in the statute would
prevent challenges to a decision based on actual unfairness of the
proceedings, thus expressly acknowledging the due process foundations
of the doctrine,4 9 and, second, that nothing prevented the courts from
restricting or eliminating the doctrine altogether.3 0

41. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.36.010. Land use actions to which the doctrine applies
include: zoning map amendments (rezones), zoning variances and conditional use permits,
preliminary plat approvals, and shoreline permits. See SETTLE, supra note 30, at 208-09.
42. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 42.36.010, .030.
43. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 42.36.020, .040, .050.
44. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.36.060.
45. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.36.070.
46. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.36.080.
47. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.36.090.
48. While the Appearance of Fairness Statute as enacted mostly codified and clarified thenexisting case law, the legislative history indicates animosity toward the doctrine. In 1981, the
legislature passed a bill, vetoed by the governor, which attempted to abrogate the doctrine
altogether. Sections 100 and 110 of the 1982 statute, acknowledging the underlying right to due
process and expressly authorizing the courts to restrict or eliminate the doctrine, are remnants of
that legislative sentiment. See SETTLE, supra note 30, at 223.
49. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.36.110.
50. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.36.100.
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The Legislature thereby set the statutory framework within which
the appearance of fairness doctrine has functioned ever since. In doing
so, the Legislature resolved some issues that the court either had not
been able to resolve or had been reluctant to address. First, the
Legislature identified classes of actions to which the doctrine would
and would not apply. Further, it protected elected officials from
liability for campaign activities and provided a mechanism for handling
the inevitable ex parte contacts."' But it also kept the doctrine alive,
which disappointed the doctrine's antagonists who wanted it repudiated.52 They continued their fight after the statute became law.
D. Judicial Retreat
Immediately after enactment of the statute, Justice Utter, in a
series of dissenting and concurring opinions, attacked the appearance
of fairness doctrine and advocated its elimination and replacement with
either the Code of Judicial Conduct or the constitutional due process
standard.13 Utter's concerns centered on three main issues. First, the
"speculative claims of injustice" of some appearance of fairness
challenges subject nonjudicial decision makers to a higher standard
than is applied to judges themselves.5 4 Second, the doctrine is
misleading and confusing to apply, for both courts and decision
makers.55 Third, there is no substantial difference between the
appearance of fairness doctrine as applied and due process principles,
since the latter also have an implicit element of apparent fairness.56
After the statute was enacted, the Washington Supreme Court
began to restrict the doctrine's application by interpreting the scope of
quasi-judicial action more narrowly. In Harrisv. Hornbaker,the court
held that when a board of county commissioners decides where to

51. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.36.060. The statutory procedure for ex parte communications
is similar to the due process requirements reflected in the Administrative Procedure Act, WASH.
REV. CODE § 34.05.455 (1996), and in such federal cases as Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298
(D.C. Cir. 1981).
52. Among the judiciary, Justice Utter was the most visible, with his opinions in: Harris
v. Hornbaker, 98 Wash. 2d 650, 664-68, 658 P.2d 1219, 1228-30 (1983) (Utter, J., concurring);
Washington Med. Disciplinary Bd., 99 Wash. 2d at 483-85, 663 P.2d at 466-67 (Utter, J.,
concurring); Zehring v. City of Bellevue (Zehring I), 99 Wash. 2d 488, 499-501, 663 P.2d 823,
829-30 (1983) (Utter, J., dissenting), vacated, Zehring v. City of Bellevue (Zehring II), 103 Wash.
2d 588, 694 P.2d 638 (1985).
53. Harris,98 Wash. 2d at 664-68, 658 P.2d at 1228-30; Washington Med. DisciplinaryBd.,
99 Wash. 2d at 483-85, 663 P.2d at 466-69; Zehring 1, 99 Wash. 2d at 499-501.
54. Harris, 98 Wash. 2d at 667 n.3; 658 P.3d at 1230 n.3.
55. Id. at 666-67, 658 P.2d at 1229-30; Washington Med. Disciplinary Bd., 99 Wash. 2d at
485, 663 P.2d at 469.
56. Washington Med. DisciplinaryBd., 99 Wash. 2d at 484-85, 663 P.3d at 467.
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locate a highway interchange, the board acts legislatively, and thus, the
appearance of fairness doctrine would not apply.5 7 In Zehring v. City
of Bellevue (Zehring II), the court reversed a previous decision on the
same issue in holding that a planning commission's design review
hearings, on which a city council rezone was contingent, were not
quasi-judicial because no public hearing was required by statute.58 In
Raynes v. City of Leavenworth, the court held that all textual zoning
changes are legislative, not quasi-judicial, even when they affect only
one specific site and one property owner. 59 This decision, then,
broadly interpreted the limiting language in the Appearance of Fairness
Statute and overruled Fleming to the extent it was conflicting.6"
Another way the court restricted application of the doctrine was
to establish a new threshold inquiry for challenges under the doctrine.
"Without evidence of actual or potential bias, an appearance of fairness

claim cannot succeed and is without merit."'" This test, announced
in the State v. Post criminal appeal, is clearly intended as a threshold
requirement for all appearance of fairness challenges.62 Mandating as
a threshold at least some evidence of decision-maker bias is a major
departure from the standard of the "disinterested person" observing the
process, which distinguished "fair in appearance" from the merely "fair
in substance."6 3
Finally, the court's most recent statement on the appearance of
fairness doctrine was a rather brusque dismissal of all challenges based
on decision makers' prejudgment and ex parte contacts during permit
proceedings in the context of a county decision concerning a major
landfill site in eastern Washington.6 4 The Organization to Preserve

57. Harris,98 Wash. 2d at 659, 658 P.3d at 1222.
58. Zehring v. City of Bellevue (Zehring II), 103 Wash. 2d 588, 590-91, 694 P.2d 638, 639
(1985), vacating Zehring v. City of Bellevue (Zehring I), 99 Wash. 2d 488, 663 P.2d 823 (1983).
59. Raynes v. City of Leavenworth, 118 Wash. 2d 237, 247-48, 821 P.2d 1204, 1209
(1992).
60. Id.
61. State v. Post, 118 Wash. 2d 596, 619, 826 P.2d 172, 185, amended, 837 P.2d 599
(1992).
62. Id. at 619 n.8, 826 P.2d at 185 n.8; Organization to Preserve Agric. Lands v. Adams
County, 128 Wash. 2d 869, 890, 913 P.2d 793, 805 (1996) [hereinafter OPAL v. Adams
County].
63. Smith v. Skagit County, 75 Wash. 2d 715, 739, 453 P.2d 832, 846 (1969).
64. OPAL v. Adams County, 128 Wash. 2d 869, 913 P.2d 793 (1996). In OPAL, an
opposition group challenged the decision of the Adams County Board of County Commissioners
to grant an unclassified use permit allowing a large private company to develop and operate a
regional solid waste landfill and recycling facility in the county. The opponents based their
challenge on alleged violations of the Washington Environmental Policy Act, the Open Public
Meetings Act, and public contracting statutes, in addition to the appearance of fairness doctrine.
One commissioner had 63 long distance telephone calls with project proponents before the public
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Agricultural Lands (OPAL) v. Adams County decision, while not adding
6
anything to the doctrine other than in reaffirming the Post test, " is
significant as a statement by a unanimous court narrowly applying the
existing law on appearances. In the face of flagrantly partial behavior
by decision makers, the court expansively interpreted the statutory
limitations on application of the appearance of fairness doctrine,
especially for elected officials' business of office and ex parte con67
tacts," and broadly deferred to the trial court's discretion.
Interestingly, the OPAL court implied that under the Post test the
standard to be applied to the prejudgment claim may have to be actual
bias and unfairness on the merits and not just as a threshold showing.68 If this was the court's intent, the appearance of fairness
doctrine suffered yet another serious blow.
E. Summary of the Current Appearance of Fairness Doctrine
The objective of the doctrine is that "whenever the law requires
a hearing of any sort as a condition precedent to the power to proceed,
it means a fair hearing, a hearing not only fair in substance, but fair in
appearance as well."69 The test for fairness is whether a "reasonably
prudent and disinterested observer"7 ° could conclude from a proceeding that (1) "everyone had been heard who, in all fairness, should have
been heard,"'" and (2) "having been apprised of the totality of a
board member's personal interest in a matter being acted upon, [can]
be reasonably justified in thinking that partiality [did not] exist. "72
This test thus contains two requirements: that quasi-judicial hearings
be procedurally fair and that decision makers be, and appear to be,
impartial.

hearing on the proposal. Another commissioner made clear, public statements of his support for
the project and threatened project opponents (a private businessman and the planning director)
with retribution through his public office. The court affirmed the trial court's upholding of the
board's decision on all claims presented.
65. OPAL, 128 Wash. 2d at 890, 913 P.2d at 805.
66. Id. at 886, 913 P.2d at 803.
67. Id. at 887, 890, 913 P.2d at 804-05.
68. Id. at 890, 913 P.2d at 805.
69. Smith v. Skagit County, 75 Wash. 2d 715, 739, 453 P.2d 832, 846 (1969). The court
later relaxed the contingency on a statutorily required public hearing in Harris, 98 Wash. 2d at
660, 658 P.2d at 1223.
70. Washington Med. Disciplinary Bd. v. Johnston, 99 Wash. 2d 466, 479, 663 P.2d 457,
465 (1983).
71. Smith, 75 Wash. 2d at 741, 453 P.2d at 847.
72. Swift v. Island County, 87 Wash. 2d 348, 361, 552 P.2d 175, 183 (1976).
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Generally, any proceeding determining the rights of individual
parties must be open-with adequate notice73 and opportunity for the
parties and/or the public to be heard74 and even to cross-examine 75-- and must have decision makers without partiality as to the
parties or prejudgment or personal interest as to the issue at hand, all
as determined by the reasonable, disinterested person standard.76
Any hearing without such procedures should be canceled, and any
decision maker with such interest or bias should disqualify himself or
herself, or else be subject to a disqualification challenge and risk
subsequent invalidation of the action by courts upon review.77
The thorny questions concern to whom, when, and in what
actions the fairness in decision making applies. The Appearance of
Fairness Statute 78 declares that the doctrine applies to quasi-judicial
actions of local decision-making bodies,79 which it defines as those
which "determine the legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific
parties in a hearing or other contested case proceeding,"80 while areawide plans and zoning are legislative and cannot be invalidated by
application of the doctrine.8 ' The doctrine thus applies to all types
of decision makers who are acting in quasi-judicial proceedings. In
recent years, however, the court has been increasingly narrow in its
interpretations of what is quasi-judicial for purposes of appearance of
fairness, thus in effect restricting application of the doctrine under the
statute.82
The statute provides additional protections for legislators who
might be involved in quasi-judicial actions. Their campaign activities,
such as statements of opinion or campaign contributions, are exempt
from challenge on appearance of fairness grounds.83 So too is any
73. Glaspey & Sons, Inc. v. Conrad, 83 Wash. 2d 707, 521 P.2d 1173 (1974), cited in
SETTLE, supra note 30, at 212.
74. Fleming, 81 Wash. 2d at 296, 502 P.2d at 329.
75. Chrobuck, 78 Wash. 2d at 870, 480 P.2d at 496.
76. Buell, 80 Wash. 2d at 524, 495 P.2d at 1362.
77. The remedy for appearance of fairness violations, as for most due process infringements,
is invalidation of the government action in which the violation occurred. Alger v. City of
Mukilteo, 107 Wash. 2d 541, 547, 730 P.2d 1333, 1336 (1987); SETTLE, supra note 30, at 199200. See also MUNICIPAL RESEARCH AND SERVICES CENTER, THE APPEARANCE OF FAIRNESS

DOCTRINE IN WASHINGTON STATE 14-15 (Report No. 32, 1995) [hereinafter MSRC REPORT].
78. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.36 (1996).
79. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.36.010.
80. Id.
81.

WASH. REV. CODE § 42.36.030.

82. See Raynes, 118 Wash. 2d at 248-49, 821 P.2d at 1210; Zehring II, 103 Wash. 2d at
590-91, 694 P.2d at 639; Harris, 98 Wash. 2d at 659, 658 P.2d at 1223.
83. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 42.36.040, .050; see also Snohomish County Improvement
Alliance v. Snohomish County, 61 Wash. App. 64, 808 P.2d 781 (1991).
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prior participation on advisory panels on the issue considered or any
activities related to the business of his or her office.84 Thus, the
doctrine does not apply to a legislator's past activities, campaign
opinions and obligations, and current business connections, that could
pertain to the subject even of quasi-judicial decisions.
Nevertheless, the doctrine comes into play for all decision makers,
including legislators, during any quasi-judicial proceeding. In the
course of such proceedings, no decision maker is permitted to have ex
parte communications with proponents or opponents concerning the
subject proposal, unless (1) the contents of the communication are
placed in the record and (2) an announcement of the content and an
opportunity to rebut are provided at each hearing.8 5 The decision
maker is permitted to consult with his or her staff if the staff is not
strongly associated as the proponent of the proposal.86 Despite these
statutory strictures, the OPAL decision indicates that the courts will
give wide berth to ex parte communications by legislators acting in a
quasi-judicial role.87
In practice, the decision makers are normally apprised of the
applicability of the doctrine to the action they are undertaking, upon
which they recite for the record any interests, opinions, or contacts
they may have had with respect to the proposal or its proponents.88
An appearance of fairness challenge to participation of a decision maker
must be made either at the time of disclosure or as soon as the
challenger learns of the basis for a disqualification. Otherwise, the
right to challenge is waived.89

84. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 42.36.020, .070.
85. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.36.060.
86. North Kingston Community Ass'n v. Lindsey, No. 36235-6-I, 1996 Wash. App.
LEXIS 332 (Wash. App. Sept. 3, 1996), rev. denied, 131 Wash. 2d 1016, 936 P.2d 416 (holding
that the county staff is not a "party" for purposes of the ex parte communication proscription,
even when the staff recommended approval of the project); cf Weyerhaeuser v. Pierce County,
124 Wash. 2d 26, 873 P.2d 498 (1994) (holding that county staff members can be witnesses
subject to cross-examination, because the county was essentially a real party in interest in the
project proposal).
87. See OPAL, 128 Wash. 2d 869, 913 P.2d 793.
88. Id. at 885, 913 P.2d at 803. See MSRC REPORT, supra note 77, at 35-36. Disclosure
may be a partial alternative to self-disqualification, at least for contacts and some types of personal
interest. Disclosure also shifts the burden to any potential challenger to assert a violation of the
doctrine or waive the right to do so forever. See SETTLE, supra note 30, at 220, 222. Settle also
suggests a strategy of disqualifying a sympathetic decision maker whose participation might be
a basis for subsequent invalidation of the action once nondisclosed disqualifying information has
become known. Id. at 222.
89. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.36.080 (1996). This section is a codification of the doctrine
of laches, which the court applied in the appearance of fairness doctrine context in Buell v. City
of Bremerton, 80 Wash. 2d at 523, 495 P.2d at 1362.
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Any appearance of fairness challenge must now also present at
least some evidence of "actual or potential bias" in order even to get
into court. 90 The significance of the Post threshold test for the
viability and application of the appearance of fairness doctrine is not
yet clear, but the subject is examined in considerable depth in the
following sections.
III.

THE PHANTOM DOCTRINE: Now You SEE IT,
Now You DON'T

The appearance of fairness doctrine as developed judicially and
legislatively is still good law in Washington state. Despite being
continually confronted with appearance of fairness issues, the court has
declined the Legislature's invitation for "restriction or elimination" of
the doctrine."1 The court has not expressly overruled any significant
parts of the doctrine,9 2 but it also has not found a single violation of
the doctrine in a land use case since the Legislature acted in 1982." 3
The terse OPAL opinion in 1996 by a unanimous court suggests a
judicial attempt to back away from the grand pronouncements on
philosophy and policy which it had articulated as it was formulating
the doctrine a quarter century earlier.
But the appearance of fairness doctrine remains a powerful
potential force in local land use decision making, if not in the broader
realm of administrative actions.9 4 The status of the doctrine and its
application by the courts remains of considerable importance to local
government decision makers and attorneys throughout Washington.
The primary problem after the OPAL decision is whether the courts
are enforcing the doctrine any more, to any set of facts. If not, then
why not? What about the important policy purposes for which the
courts originally developed the doctrine? If the doctrine is still
potentially enforceable, then what exactly is the scope and substance
of the doctrine today that decision makers and challengers can rely on?

90. State v. Post, 118 Wash. 2d 596, 619, 826 P.2d 172, 185, amended, 837 P.2d 599
(1992).
91. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.36.100 (1996).
92. A possible exception is the residual overruling of a Fleming holding in Raynes v. City
of Leavenworth, 118 Wash. 2d at 247, 821 P.2d at 1209.
93. See OPAL, 128 Wash. 2d 869, 913 P.2d 793 (1996); Raynes, 118 Wash. 2d 237, 821
P.2d 1204 (1992); Zehring II, 103 Wash. 2d 588, 694 P.2d 638 (1985); Washington Med.
DisciplinaryBd., 99 Wash. 2d 466, 663 P.2d 457 (1983); Harris,98 Wash. 2d 650, 658 P.2d 1219
(1983).
94. See SETTLE, supra note 30, Chap. 6; see also MSRC REPORT, supra note 77.
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Enforcement by the Courts

In OPAL, the court applied the current appearance of fairness
doctrine to a set of facts that included numerous undisclosed ex parte
communications between a legislative decision maker and project
proponents, as well as statements and actions strongly suggesting bias
and prejudgment of the issue by a decision maker, all during the
pendency of a quasi-judicial proceeding." The fact that the court
never even hinted at an appearance of fairness violation calls into
question the validity of assumptions about the court's readiness and
willingness to enforce the doctrine in land use decisions. The factual
situations in OPAL may not be as egregious as in the earliest cases of
aluminum plants on Guemes Island96 or oil refineries at Kayak
Point,9 7 but there certainly are similarities in decision-maker behavior.
The court's reluctance to enforce the doctrine suggests a possible
shift in the court's application of its doctrinal creation, even as
modified by the statutory limitations. There are several possible
explanations for this enforcement gap. One is that the court is willing
to enforce the doctrine, but is attempting more narrowing or clarification in its applicability, especially with respect to legislative decision
makers. Under this theory, the problem with appearance of fairness
as applied is with the nature of legislators, no matter whether they are
undertaking legislative or quasi-judicial actions. The natural role of
the legislator is to talk to people who have public business, to have
opinions on issues, and to speak out on policy. This role and
orientation is incompatible with the strictures of appearance of fairness
in quasi-judicial proceedings.9
Given the numerous procedural
protections in place for most significant land use project decisions,
recent decisions, such as in Raynes and OPAL, may be indicating a
court more likely to define actions of legislators as "legislative" and
thus exempt from the doctrine, and softening its enforcement of
activities "typical" of legislators, whether or not they could be seen as
crossing the line.99
A second possible explanation is that the court is really applying
a due process standard to public decision making, and therefore is not
enforcing the more stringent appearance of fairness. The OPAL court
95. OPAL, 128 Wash. 2d at 884-90, 913 P.2d at 802-05. See also supra note 64.
96. Smith v. Skagit County, 75 Wash. 2d 715, 453 P.2d 832 (1969).
97. Chrobuck v. Snohomish County, 78 Wash. 2d 858, 480 P.2d 489 (1971).
98. Van Noy, supra note 7, at 556.
99. See Raynes, 118 Wash. 2d at 248-49, 821 P.2d at 1210 (1992); OPAL, 128 Wash. 2d
at 887, 913 P.2d at 803-04.
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reaffirmed the appearance of fairness doctrine that "quasi-judicial
hearings ... must be conducted so as to give the appearance of
fairness and impartiality."'0 0 But the court also reiterated its Post
qualification that "[w]ithout evidence of actual or potential bias, an
appearance of fairness claim cannot succeed."'01 If evidence of actual
or potential bias on the part of decision makers is a threshold for even
obtaining judicial review, then it can be argued that the inquiry shifts
to more traditional due process concerns that have underlain quasijudicial decision making all along.0 2 Commentators have asserted
that most of the cases in which the court built the appearance of
fairness doctrine were actually decided on due process grounds, with
appearance of fairness as dictum.1° '
If the appearance of fairness doctrine, including the Post test,
essentially reduces to traditional due process, then the disinterested
observer fades away, and the focus is on decision-maker behavior as
the condition for a fair hearing. Due process not only involves a
concern for whether actual wrongs occurred; "due process also concerns
protecting against even 'the probability of unfairness.""
Due
process analysis, as Justice Utter maintained, is deeply and consistently
rooted constitutionally and jurisprudentially, and is supported by
numerous statutory frameworks for administrative decisions105
The problem, then, under this theory, is that the appearance of
fairness doctrine has a name and a history, but with the Post test it is
virtually a due process standard. This would help to explain the
strongly stated result in OPAL, and leads to a third explanation of the
court's lack of enforcement of appearance of fairness challenges-which
may be the primary motivation underlying the court's revision of the
doctrine's scope and substance.
Since the court's first announcement of the appearance of fairness
doctrine in 1969, the statutory landscape for local land use decisions in
Washington has literally been transformed.
The Washington
Environmental Policy Act (SEPA) °6 and the Shoreline Management

100. OPAL, 128 Wash. 2d at 889, 913 P.2d at 805.
101. State v. Post, 118 Wash. 2d 596, 619, 826 P.2d 172, 185, amended, 837 P.2d 599
(1992).
102. Washington Med. Disciplinary Bd., 99 Wash. 2d at 484, 663 P.2d at 467 (Utter, J.,
concurring). The majority concluded that "no actual prejudice has been demonstrated in the
present case." Id. at 481, 663 P.2d at 465.
103. Vache, supra note 13, at 480.
104. Washington Med. DisciplinaryBd., 99 Wash. 2d at 484, 663 P.2d at 467 (Utter, J.,
concurring, quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).
105. Harris, 98 Wash. 2d at 668, 658 P.2d at 1230 (Utter, J., concurring).
106. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C (1996).
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Act (SMA), °7 along with the more recent Growth Management Act
0
and its 1995 amendments, °9 have added a great deal of
(GMA)"'
information and process to local land use project review and decision
making. The process contains protections for the public in the form
of opportunities to participate, due process guarantees, project
compliance with statutory mandates, and judicial review of compliance.
Meanwhile, the uninhibited role of planning commissions and
legislative bodies in the decision-making process has become constrained by statutory mandates and overshadowed by administrative
staff and hearing examiner roles. 1 0
Under this third explanation, then, the court's lack of enforcement
of the doctrine is based on deference to these statutory processes
enacted by the legislature to protect the public interest and public
confidence in government. The appearance of fairness doctrine stands
ready to be applied, but the court is reluctant because a more direct
and reliable legal scheme is available and is consistently functioning."' The existence of the statutory processes would then also
explain the court's progressive restriction of the scope and substance
of the doctrine for any potential application within the statutory
scheme.
B. Effects of DoctrinalAmbiguity
If the appearance of fairness doctrine is still good law in Washington, but its current parameters and its enforcement by the courts have
become clouded and uncertain, local government decision makers are
left without clear guidelines and expectations on which to rely in
carrying out their duties. Their uncertainty lies in the questions of
whether the doctrine applies to the specific action they are undertaking,
and, if so, how close must a relationship, an interest, or a prior
statement be to the issue at hand in order to mandate disqualification.

107.
108.
109.
110.
examiner

WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.
WAsH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.
1995 Wash. Laws 347, 382.
The 1995 GMA amendments even offer the option for a jurisdiction to make hearing
decisions either final (no legislative body decision) or reviewable by the legislative body

as an closed-record administrative appeal. 1995 Wash. Laws 347, §§ 423-425, 428-429 (codified
at WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70B.060(6)).
111. Recent courts have tended to reverse local land use decisions on grounds of statutory
violations and not even to address the connected appearance of fairness challenges. See, e.g.,
Washington State Dept. of Corrections v. City of Kennewick, 86 Wash. App. 521, 937 P.2d 1119
(1997). This is a complete turnabout from early appearance of fairness cases, where courts
highlighted violations of the doctrine essentially as dictum, while reversing on statutory zoning
grounds. See, e.g., Smith v. Skagit County, 75 Wash. 2d 715, 453 P.2d 832 (1969).
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The consequences for a false positive determination are removal of a
competent decision maker and disruption of the jurisdiction's decision
process. The consequences for a false negative may be endless
litigation and ultimate invalidation of the decision.
The 1982 statute clarifies when the appearance of fairness doctrine
applies, but the determination is far from clear. Whenever a legislative
or administrative body, acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, "conducts
a public hearing, required by law, to decide the rights of individual
parties to engage in or refrain from some activity, the appearance of
fairness doctrine should apply.""12 Prudence (and counsel from
attorneys) may dictate erring toward the assumption that the doctrine
does apply, but there is an associated cost in terms of efficiency in the
decision process and in fairness and representation to the public who
elected the decision maker." 3
The statute and its case law have not clearly spelled out for
decision makers what constitutes a violation of the appearance of
fairness doctrine. The applicable test has been: "would a disinterested
person, having been apprised of the totality of a board member's
personal interest in a matter being acted upon, be reasonably justified
in thinking that partiality may exist?""' 4 The problem is that this
test leads to "a speculative and conjectural fairness inquiry,""' 5 the
outcome of which many decision makers have no basis to predict at the
time of the proceedings. There is confusion even among attorneys
concerning this "obscure doctrine.""' 6 Judges too are "at best
uncertain as to its jurisprudential roots and how it should be applied.""' 7 If this is so, how can local decision makers be expected to
react correctly to its demands?
Moreover, recent decisions, such as in Raynes, Post, and OPAL,
have added further confusion by redefining the scope and substance of
the doctrine. The Raynes court continued to narrow the definition of
what constitutes quasi-judicial action on the part of legislative decision
makers."' The Post court added the threshold test requiring at least
some evidence of actual or potential bias before the doctrine could be

112. Zehring 1, 99 Wash. 2d at 500, 663 P.2d at 829 (Utter, J., dissenting), vacated in
Zehring II, 103 Wash. 2d 588, 694 P.2d 638 (1985).
113. 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Wasco County Court, 742 P.2d 39, 44 (Or. 1987).
114. Swift v. Island County, 87 Wash. 2d 348, 361, 552 P.2d 175, 183 (1976).
115. Harris,98 Wash. 2d at 668, 658 P.2d at 1229 (Utter, J., concurring).
116. Zehring 1, 99 Wash. 2d at 500, 663 P.2d at 830.
117. Id.
118. Raynes, 118 Wash. 2d at 247-48, 821 P.2d at 1209.
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applied." 9 The OPAL court definitively placed a set of clear,
unreported ex parte contacts by a decision maker beyond the reach of
the doctrine as applied. 2 ' With these ongoing restrictions of the
doctrine's applicability, even if its standard has evolved away from the
disinterested person inquiry and toward traditional due process, the
appearance of fairness doctrine may be no clearer for attorneys, judges,
or decision makers than in its wide-open past.
Why the Phantom Doctrine Will Rarely Be Seen
Lack of enforcement by the courts and ambiguity in doctrinal
scope and substance suggest that the appearance of fairness doctrine
may not be just waiting in the wings to reappear.
The flavor of the early appearance of fairness decisions was that
local land use decision makers were grossly flouting the public interest
they were sworn to uphold. Project proponents ensured successful
action by consorting with, and perhaps benefiting, the local decision
makers, while the public at large and project opponents were shut out.
The courts in response defended the public's interest against this cabal.
Today, the public is certainly more protected with the multilayered
procedures of statutory compliance, as well as through the better
established standards of constitutional due process in administrative
actions. Yet, with or without active judicial enforcement, the
appearance of fairness doctrine still exists to snare unwary decision
makers and to invalidate actions that may have been in fact both
correct and fair, at heavy cost to both project proponent and govern12
ment agency. '
The next section will address the questions of (1) whether the
emergent statutory framework governing local land use decisions has
effectively superseded the judicial usefulness of the appearance of
fairness doctrine, and (2) whether as a consequence the doctrine has in
fact dwindled to the point of equivalence with procedural due process.
The argument throughout is that the statutory and doctrinal changes
since SEPA and SMA were enacted 1971 have rendered the appearance
of fairness doctrine of little utility to the goal of fairness and public
confidence in government, thus making it increasingly irrelevant to
modern land use decision making.
C.

119. Post, 118 Wash. 2d at 619, 826 P.2d at 185.
120. OPAL, 128 Wash. 2d at 886, 913 P.2d at 803.
121. As the OPAL v. Adams County facts indicated, local decision makers may not yet be
complete innocents, but it is the presumption that any decision maker contacts will pollute fairness
which is a vestige from the formative years of the doctrine.
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THE ASCENDANCY OF STATUTORY PROTECTIONS
AND DUE PROCESS

The lack of enforcement and doctrinal ambiguity problems
identified in the previous section assume that the appearance of fairness
doctrine is still a distinct and applicable feature of the legal landscape
on which local government decisions are made. If it is a distinct
feature, then the existence of those problems might call for additional
modifications even beyond the current statutory limitations. But the
OPAL decision, along with the complete absence of violations found
by courts since 1982, suggest that it is not. If it is not distinct and
applicable, then what has happened to it?
The most obvious explanation is that the court believes the many
environmental statutes which now govern land use decision making
require sufficient procedural protections and offer enough access points
for citizen input and appeal so that the original goals of fairness and
public confidence are met. 122 In addition, given this belief, the court,
following Justice Utter's earlier arguments, 2 3 then introduced the
Post test to make the appearance of fairness doctrine the functional
equivalent of procedural due process.124 As a result, the appearance
of fairness doctrine, while still good law, has been relegated to an
essentially inactive status, a relic of the needs of a previous generation.
Emergence of a Statutory Framework
The appearance of fairness doctrine was born in an era when local
land use decisions consisted of comprehensive plans, plat approvals,
and rezonings. Since that time, the statutory landscape for local land
use decisions has been transformed rather completely. In 1971, the
Washington Environmental Policy Act (SEPA) 12 and the Shoreline
Management Act (SMA) 126 were first enacted. Not only did the
Legislature in these statutes declare a clear public interest in ensuring
A.

122. The original environmental statutes were the Washington Environmental Policy Act
(1971), WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C, and the Shoreline Management Act (1971), WASH. REV.
CODE § 90.58 (1996). More recent additions include the Growth Management Act (1990),
WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A (1996), the Local Project Review Act (1995), WASH. REV. CODE
§ 36.70B (1996), and the Land Use Petition Act (1995), WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70C (1996).
123. Washington Med. Disciplinary Bd., 99 Wash. 2d at 484, 663 P.2d at 467 (Utter, J.,
concurring).
124. Post, 118 Wash. 2d at 619, 826 P.2d at 185. Due process focuses the inquiry on the
actual fairness of the decision process rather than on the disinterested person viewing the process
and its participants.
125. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C (1996).
126. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.
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environmental quality and protecting the state's shorelines, but it also
established procedures for reviewing proposed developments and for
enforcing adherence to the stated policies through the courts. 12 7 In
other words, SEPA and SMA created a set of statutory rights, along
with an enforcement process, through which citizens could act to
promote accountability in local land use decisions.
Meanwhile, throughout most of the 1970s, while the perimeters
and the procedures under these statutes were being determined by the
courts,"' it was business as usual for local land use decisions, a
situation which led to the continuous expansion of the appearance of
fairness doctrine described above.'29 By the early 1980s, when the
legislature limited the scope and application of the appearance of
fairness doctrine, SEPA and SMA had become deeply institutionalized
in local land use decision making. The major cases had answered the
statutory uncertainties, and administrative regulations detailed the
resulting rules for all participants. 3 Developers, citizen groups, and
local governments all had learned and internalized the new game and
its rules. The SEPA and SMA rules required a considerable amount
of project information and process, including environmental impact
statements, public involvement, and shoreline plans and permits if
127. For example, in SEPA: "The legislature recognizes that each person has a fundamental
and inalienable right to a healthful environment and that each person has a responsibility to
contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the environment." WASH. REV. CODE
§ 43.21C.020(3) (1996). Also, in the SMA: "It is the policy of the state ... to insure the
development of [the shorelines of the state] in a manner which ...will promote and enhance the
public interest." WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.020 (1996). As for the "action-forcing" procedures
of SEPA, the court insisted from the start that the procedural duties be performed with maximum
diligence because the statute was "an attempt by the people to shape their future environment by
deliberation, not default." Stempel v. Department of Water Resources, 82 Wash. 2d 109, 118,
508 P.2d 166, 172 (1973).
128. For SEPA decisions, see Juanita Bay Valley Community Ass'n v. City of Kirkland, 9
Wash. App. 59, 510 P.2d 1140 (1973) (threshold determination); Norway Hill Preservation &
Protection Ass'n v. King County Council, 87 Wash. 2d 267, 552 P.2d 674 (1976) (significance);
Lassila v. City of Wenatchee, 89 Wash. 2d 804, 576 P.2d 54 (1978) (project proposal); Barrie v.
Kitsap Co., 93 Wash. 2d 843, 613 P.2d 1148 (1980) (EIS adequacy). For SMA decisions, see
Weyerhaeuser v. King County, 91 Wash. 2d 721, 592 P.2d 1108 (1979) (conditions attached to
shoreline permits, preemption by other statutes); Department of Natural Resoures v. Thurston
County, 92 Wash. 2d 656, 601 P.2d 494 (1979) (relationship to SEPA); English Bay Enterprises,
Ltd. v. Island County, 89 Wash. 2d 16, 568 P.2d 783 (1977) (scope of "development");
Department of Ecology v. Ballard Elks, 84 Wash. 2d 551, 527 P.2d 1121 (1974) (judicial
deference to Shoreline Hearings Board); Talbot v. Gray, 11 Wash. App. 807, 525 P.2d 801 (1974)
(vesting of shoreline permit application).
129. See discussion supra Part II.B.
130. For SEPA rules, see generally WASH. ADMIN. CODE Ch. 197-11 (SEPA rules), plus
rules for SEPA compliance published by individual state agencies and local governments; for SMA
rules, see generally WASH. ADMIN. CODE Ch. 173-16 (shoreline master programs) and 173-27
(shoreline permits) (1996).
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complying with the local shoreline master program. 1 ' There were
many points on which any proposed project could be challenged, much
information to utilize in any challenge, many opportunities for input
or opposition through the lengthy processes required under the
statutes, and at least several administrative and judicial channels
through which to launch challenges.
With the advent of the Growth Management Act (GMA) in
1990,132 and especially its subsequent amendments in 1995,133 the
statutory landscape for land use decisions has nearly completed its
major transformation. The original growth management planning
process bolstered the traditional comprehensive planning for counties
and cities and introduced substantial citizen involvement in determining the local planned futures. The 1995 amendments consolidated and
restructured the local land use review and permit procedures from
SEPA and SMA, as well as zoning and other local requirements, along
with their appeals, both administrative and judicial.'34 Particularly
important is the integration of land use and environmental review for
land use project applications, mandatory for jurisdictions planning
under the GMA, otherwise elective, along with broad public notice
requirements and strict timelines for public hearings and final decision
on any project.135 All jurisdictions are authorized and encouraged to
use hearing examiners in the project reviews, and may even allow
bodies to make the final
hearing examiners instead of legislative
13 6
decisions.
rezone
but
all
on
decisions

131. For specific SEPA rules, see WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 197-11-305-390 (threshold
determination requirements); WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 197-11-400-460 (environmental impact
statement process and contents); WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 197-11-408-410, 500-570, 960-990
(public involvement). For specific SMA rules, see WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-16-040 (shoreline
master programs); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-27-110 (shoreline permit notice requirements);
These rules define minimum
§ 173-27-180 (shoreline permit application requirements).
requirements: local government SEPA and SMA rules may set forth additional process and
information.
132. 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 17, supplemented by 1991 Wash. Laws ch. 32 (codified at
WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A (1996)).
133. 1995 Wash. Laws ch. 347, 382; these are referred to collectively as ESHB 1724.
134. Consolidated land use review, along with administrative appeals, known as the Local
Project Review Act, is codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70B (1996); the restructured judicial
review process is called the Land Use Petition Act and is codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70C
(1996).
135. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70B.060-.130 (1996).
136. Hearing examiners may conduct the single public hearing on the consolidated permit
application in jurisdictions subject to the GMA. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70B.110(7). GMA
local governments may provide for a local dosed-record administrative appeal of the project
decision, either to a hearing examiner or to the legislative body, which then is the final decision
of the local government. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70B.110(9), .120(2). Other jurisdictions are
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It is almost inconceivable that the large shoreline industrial
complexes proposed in Smith and Chrobuck would ever have been
applied for if faced with even the pre-GMA statutory process.13 7 If
they had been, the role of citizen groups would have been much greater
under SEPA and SMA processes, while the role of the planning and
county commissioners in actual decision making would have been far
smaller and probably based in statutory compliance with SEPA and a
shoreline master program. The question then is whether the opportunity for prejudgment or personal interest to affect the decision (or
appear to do so) would consequently be lessened. After all, SEPA
compliance did not stop the approval, or the challenge on appearance
of fairness grounds, in the OPAL case.138
In the early appearance of fairness cases, the violating actors were
appointed members of planning commissions and elected county
commissioners and city council members. They operated quite legally
in an environment of independence, back-room discussions and deals,
and minimal necessity of public involvement or scrutiny. SEPA, for
all project proposals, and SMA, for those on shorelines of the state,
introduced at least a minimum structure of environmental review,
consistency with plans, public declaration on environmental significance, and citizen notice and opportunity to be heard. On appeal, the
Shorelines Hearings Board always, and the courts sometimes (under
SEPA), review the local project decision de novo, thus with an open
invitation to substitute its judgment for that of the local decision maker.139

authorized to adopt these procedures. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70B.1 50.
137. The aluminum plant on the Guemes Island shoreline and the oil refinery on the
Snohomish County shoreline would certainly require at least a shoreline substantial development
permit (if consistent with the local shoreline master program-unlikely), instead probably a
shoreline variance along with a rezone, plus an environmental impact statement (if determined to
be environmentally significant-highly likely), all of which together would produce reams of
information and numerous public meetings and hearings before any local government decision.
138. OPAL, 128 Wash. 2d at 875, 913 P.2d at 798.
139. The Shorelines Hearings Board is a state agency that hears any appeal of local decisions
on shoreline permits. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.58.170, .180. It reviews the facts of each case
de novo with respect to the applicable law. San Juan County v. Department of Natural
Resources, 28 Wash. App. 796, 798-99, 626 P.2d 995, 996 (1981). If the SEPA threshold
determination is also appealed, the Board reviews both decisions jointly under a de novo standard.
Courts review SEPA determinations de novo on questions of law, and under a more deferential
clearly erroneous standard on other issues. Leschi Improvement Council et al. v. Washington
State Highway Comm'n, 84 Wash. 2d 271, 285-86, 525 P.2d 774, 784-85 (1974); see also Norway
Hill Preservation & Protection Ass'n v. King County Council, 87 Wash. 2d 267, 271-72, 552
P.2d 674, 677 (1976). Judicial review of EIS adequacy under SEPA, however, is de novo, because
the court has interpreted that issue as a question of law, though based in facts. Leschi
Improvement Council, 84 Wash. 2d at 285, 525 P.2d at 784; see also Barrie v. Kitsap County, 93
Wash. 2d 843, 854, 613 P.2d 1148, 1155 (1980).
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While the commissioners and council members still make the
significant final local decisions, they find a lot less independence and
a lot more scrutiny. Instead of merely an application for a rezone or
plat approval, the local government is inundated with environmental
checklists and impact statements, public comments on the impacts, and
a mass of technical material on specific identification and mitigation of
all types of environmental (and social) harms. 40 Professional planning directors control much of this flow of information. Staff
committees may decide whether to issue permits. Attorneys advise
staff and elected officials about compliance with the various statutes.
Hearing examiners may conduct administrative appeals concerning
what the elected officials decided. Thus, the statutes significantly
increased the roles for many new actors in the land use decision
process, thereby diminishing the independence and authority for the
decisions finally made by the commissioners and council members.
To be sure, despite all the information flow and the involvement
of new actors, nothing introduced by SEPA and SMA prevents a local
elected official from personal interest in or prejudgment of the proposal
on which he or she would decide. But the stated objectives of the
court in articulating the appearance of fairness doctrine were fairness
in governmental decision making and public confidence in that
Fairness consisted of (1) actual fairness, i.e., no actual
process.'
personal interest or prejudgment, which is guaranteed by due process
at least in quasi-judicial proceedings and is discussed further in the
following section, and (2) apparent fairness, judged by the "disinterested observer" on the proceedings taken as a whole.'4 2 Public confidence involved the perceptions of citizens that governmental decision
making was accountable to the broader public interest.'43 Regardless
of the judicial standard, the information, process, and actors brought
by SEPA and SMA transformed the awareness, involvement, and
power of citizens concerning land use project proposals in their
The statutes required notice, information, public
communities.
hearings, and opportunities to comment and be heard, as well as
offering potent tools for opposition, delay, and review of decisions.'4 4

140. See supra note 131.
141. Washington Med. Disciplinary Bd., 99 Wash. 2d at 478, 663 P.2d at 464; Harris, 98
Wash. 2d at 658, 658 P.2d at 1222 (1983).
142. Smith, 75 Wash. 2d at 739-40, 453 P.2d at 846.
143. Swift, 87 Wash. 2d at 361, 552 P.2d at 183; Chrobuck, 78 Wash. 2d at 868, 480 P.2d
at 495.
144. For SMA, see WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.140(4) (notice, comment, and hearing),
WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.180(1) (right of appeal of any permit). For SEPA, see WASH. REV.
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In these ways, the SEPA and SMA statutes, as interpreted by the
courts, achieved much of what the courts had intended in developing
the appearance of fairness doctrine.
The promise of the 1995 GMA amendments 4 ' for further
ameliorating the conditions addressed by the appearance of fairness
doctrine is even brighter. The local land use project review and
decision-making process will probably become ever more dominated by
administrative staff and hearing examiners, while the role of planning
commissions and legislative bodies becomes more perfunctory, or even
nonexistent. The consolidated permit review and its strict timetable
will make staff review and recommendations more visible and
technical. More substantive complexity and less review time will make
the use of hearing examiners more necessary. Hearing examiners may
be given final, or administrative final, decision-making authority.'46
In the former case, the legislative body would not have any role; in the
latter, it would have an appellate role, limited to review standards on
the closed hearing record.' 47 Even if the county or city chooses a
traditional role, the rigid review timetable is very restrictive for a
legislative body to conduct required predecisional hearings.
While none of these statutory changes removes the applicability
of the appearance of fairness doctrine to land use decisions, the changes
seem certain to reduce its impact. Virtually every person found in
violation of the doctrine was a member of a city council, a board of
county commissioners, or a planning commission. No violation has
ever been held for a hearing examiner, though they are clearly within
the reach of the doctrine.' 48 To the extent that the role of hearing
examiners in local land use decisions is enhanced, the roles of local
elected officials and their appointed commissioners is likely to be
diminished. To the extent that the roles of such elected officials and

CODE § 43.21C.030(2)(c) (information), WASH. REV. CODE §§ 43.21C.030(2)(d), .080(1) (notice
and comments), WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.075 (appeals).
145. 1995 Wash. Laws ch. 347, 382.
146. Consolidated project review, including SEPA environmental review, is mandated in
title 36, chapter 70B, section 120, subsection (1) of the Washington Revised Code. A strict
timetable is laid out in title 36, chapter 70B, secton 110 of the Washington Revised Code, (1996),
totaling no more than 120 days. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70B.090(1). Administrative staff, such
as the planning director, may act as a hearing examiner in developing the record and making the
final decision on land use project proposals, subject to administrative appeal to the planning
commission and/or the legislative body. Courts reviewing the decision on appeal will then review
the hearing examiner's decision, not the legislative body's. See Washington State Dept. of
Corrections v. City of Kennewick, 86 Wash. App. 521, 937 P.2d 1119 (1997).
147. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70B.060(6) (1996).
148. SETTLE, supra note 30, at 209.
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commissioners become less important, the probability of violations of
the appearance of fairness doctrine is thereby reduced.
Administrative staff who do not make final decisions on project
reviews have been held not subject to the appearance of fairness
doctrine.'49 The role of such staff grew substantially under SEPA
and SMA and will apparently increase further under the consolidated
land use project review statute. Ironically, bias and partiality may
become more of a problem in this realm as well, and, if so, they can
infect the decision-making process under a hearing examiner or a
legislative body through advice and control of information. The court
has held such staff partiality operating through ex parte communication
with decision makers not to be a violation of the appearance of fairness
doctrine, 50 unless the staff member has a "personal" stake in the
decision through his/her agency. 5'
Ex parte communications are regulated under the Appearance of
Fairness Statute.s' In local land use decisions, the ex parte contact
problem has been most acute with politicians on legislative bodies or
planning commissions. The statute provided some slack for political
activities of legislators,' 53 but the facts from the OPAL case suggest
a continuing problem, one that is perhaps endemic to politicians. Once
again, to the extent that the role of such political people in decision
making is reduced, the ex parte contact problem will certainly recede.
Professional hearing examiners are much less prone to have the type of
contacts that politicians do. But administrative staff contacts with
parties and with decision makers are likely to become more necessary
and influential in the course of expedited project review. The potential
for the introduction of bias into the overall process thus remains.
Of course, other statutory protections against public decisionmaker bias and abuse do exist. Statutes regulate public official
disclosure of finances and campaign contributions, 1 54 conflict of
interest concerning public contracts, employment, and use of public
office, ' and openness of public meetings." 6 While these do not
directly affect bias in public decision making, they do constrain the

149. Polygon Corp. v. City of Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d 59, 67-68, 578 P.2d 1309, 1314 (1978).
150. North Kingston Community Ass'n v. Lindsey, No. 36235-6-1, 1996 Wash. App.
LEXIS 332 (Wash. App. Sept. 3, 1996). See supra note 86.
151. Weyerhaeuser v. Pierce County, 124 Wash. 2d 26, 873 P.2d 498 (1994). See supra
note 86.
152. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.36.060 (1996).
153. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 42.36.040, .050.
154. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.
155. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.23.
156. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.30.
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behavior of public officials with respect to outside parties in favor of
the public at large." 7
A FunctionalEquivalent of the Due Process Standard
If the statutory framework has come to predominate in local land
use decision making, then the question still remains whether the court
stopped strictly enforcing the appearance of fairness doctrine because
the public was already protected or because it finally viewed the
doctrine as nothing more than a named variant of the constitutional
due process standard.
The appearance of fairness doctrine in Washington has operated
on top of a foundation of constitutional due process protections in
governmental actions. Due process existed before the appearance of
fairness doctrine was announced, due process continued to apply while
the Washington court refined the appearance of fairness doctrine and
after the statute limited it, 5 ' and due process forms the core of
individual protections in most other states. 5 9 Due process is certainly the fundamental goal. But the question remains whether that goal
concerns only the actual fairness of a governmental decision or whether
that goal additionally concerns the appearance to the public that the
action was fair. 160 Would a due process standard have produced the
same results in the early appearance of fairness cases? Did the recent
addition of the Post test to the doctrine functionally eliminate the
appearance of fairness doctrine by merging it with the due process
standard?
In the early 1980s, Justice Utter argued in several opinions that
there were few differences between the appearance of fairness doctrine
and the requirements of due process,' 6' and that it was a mistake to
B.

157. The legislature could develop a statute similar to that on ethics in public contracting
found in title 42, chapter 23, of the Washington Revised Code, which specifies unacceptable
behavior by public decision makers in situations to which the appearance of fairness doctrine
applies. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.23 (1996). Although such a statute would be somewhat
duplicative of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), the APA does not apply to most local
decisions. See Chaussee v. Snohomish County Council, 38 Wash. App. 630, 689 P.2d 1084
(1984). Such a statute probably would also improperly invade the prerogative of legislative
officials. Moreover, in light of the preceding discussion, it would probably be increasingly
irrelevant.
158. The continued foundation of due process is explicitly acknowledged in the Appearance
of Fairness Statute, WASH. REV. CODE § 42.36.110 (1996).
159. See, e.g., Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs of Washington County, 507 P.2d 23
(Or. 1973).
160. 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Wasco County Court, 742 P.2d 39, 44 (Or. 1987).
161. Washington State Med. DisciplinaryBd., 99 Wash. 2d at 484, 663 P.2d at 467 (Utter,
J., concurring).
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"clothe [due process] in the vague language of the 'appearance of
fairness." 1 62 Another court viewed appearance of fairness as a
"desirable further step toward the same goal" of curbing bias and selfinterest, but serving interests different from those served by standards
of actual fairness, such as the public's confidence in the process above
and beyond the parties' interests in a fair process, and exacting a
significant price in doing SO.163
Procedural due process is a constitutional doctrine resulting from
the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to actions of state and
local governments that affect "life, liberty, and property" rights of individuals. Due process issues traditionally concern (1) whether process
is due, (2) when the process should occur, and (3) what type of process
is required. In state and local land use decision making, the first two
questions are now mostly determined by statute."' However, two
early U.S. Supreme Court cases on zoning set the basic framework for
whether a process was due, and if so what type of opportunity or
hearing was necessary. Londoner v. City of Denver is widely cited as
requiring an adjudicative type of hearing for landowners affected by a
property rezoning,' 65 while Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board
of Equalization stands for the independence of the legislative body from
change in zoning
due process requirements when enacting an areawide
1 66
classification, considered a legislative function.
This legislative/adjudicative distinction is perpetuated today in
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
important statutes.
distinguishes between notice-and-comment rule-making by agencies,
considered a legislative function,'6 7 and orders from adjudicatory
proceedings, considered a quasi-judicial function requiring due
process. 6 ' Similarly, the Appearance of Fairness Statute expressly
exempts legislative functions such as areawide rezoning and comprehensive plan adoptions. 6 9 Under the statute, however, the court has
struggled with where exactly to draw the line between legislative and
quasi-judicial actions. 7 '

162. Harris, 98 Wash. 2d at 667, 658 P.2d at 1229 (Utter, J., concurring).
163. 1000 Friends of Oregon, 742 P.2d at 44.
164. These are, however, the subject of numerous U.S. Supreme Court decisions concerning
deprivation of entitlements, starting with Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
165. Londoner v. City of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
166. Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
167. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.325(5).
168. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.410 et seq.
169. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.36.010 (following Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d
292, 298-99, 502 P.2d 327, 331 (1972)).
170. See discussion supra, section II.D.
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Beyond issues of this basic distinction, many additional questions
arise concerning the third prong, namely, what type of process is
required. 7 ' If the required process is adjudicatory in nature, then
quasi-judicial standards apply, through both constitutional and
statutory authority. Quasi-judicial standards are derived from judicial
standards, which mandate judicial impartiality through avoidance of
impropriety and extra-judicial contacts and comments, thus a standard
of actual and apparent fairness (i.e., to a disinterested observer).'72
The appearance of fairness doctrine itself is arguably an attempt by the
Washington court to import the judicial standard on appearances to
supplement the due process actual fairness protections in quasi-judicial
proceedings. 73
The court has wrestled, however, with how completely this
judicial standard on appearances translates to the quasi-judicial context.
Traditional due process fairness of the decision maker concerns two
types of bias-prejudgment of the issues and personal interest in the
outcome.'7 4 Prejudgment is difficult to prove, both because it
requires express statements by the decision maker and because courts
give great deference to legislators as politicians and to administrators
as delegatees of politicians."' Even among the Washington appearance of fairness cases, only Chrobuck v. Snohomish County.7 6 and
Anderson v. Island County'77 can be said to have been decided on
prejudgment grounds.
Personal interest bias, however, is a more easily demonstrable
form of actual unfairness, and the courts have often encountered
challenges to local land use decisions on these grounds. A series of
U.S. Supreme Court decisions defined the parameters of constitutional
due process based on personal interest of the decision maker.' 78

171. Fairness also applies to the hearing procedures to ensure adequate notice, the right to
be heard, the right to cross-examine witnesses, and a hearing record; these were important fairness
elements in Smith v. Skagit County, 75 Wash. 2d 715, 453 P.2d 832 (1969).
172. WASHINGTON STATE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canons 2 and 3(D) (1994).
173. See, e.g., State ex rel. Barnard v. Board of Edu., 19 Wash. 8, 17-18 (1898); Harris v.
Hornbaker, 98 Wash. 2d 650, 665, 658 P.2d 1219, 1228 (1983) (Utter, J., concurring).
174. As it described in Buell v. City of Bremerton, 80 Wash. 2d 518, 524, 495 P.2d 1358,
1362 (1972). A third element of bias is personal favoritism or hostility, which can be both
personal interest and prejudgment. Id. See discussion supra, section II.B.
175. See, e.g., McNamara v. Borough of Saddle River, 158 A.2d 722 (N.J. Super. 1960);
Federal Trade Comm'n v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
176. 78 Wash. 2d 858, 866-67, 480 P.2d 489, 494-95 (1971).
177. 81 Wash. 2d 312, 326, 501 P.2d 594 (1972).
178. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S.
57 (1972); Commonwealth Corp. v. Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S.
510 (1927).
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Another court has usefully summarized the rules from these cases as
a three-variable continuum:' 79 (1) the degree to which the officer or
agency purports to act as a court; 180 (2) the degree to which the
issues and interests at stake resemble formal adjudications (more
judicial and less quasi);' 8' and (3) the directness of the personal
interest involved, ranging from a remotely possible temptation and
purely generic self-interest1 2 to an actual personal interest in the
outcome of the decision. 3 On facts at the high end of the continuum, the court would find a clear need for disqualification of the
decision maker in order to protect constitutional due process.
Applied to Washington cases, the first question is whether the
same results would have been reached under a due process standard of
actual unfairness as actually occurred under the Washington appearance of unfairness doctrine. Most of the major Washington land use
cases involved decision makers on county boards of commissioners or
city councils or planning commissions approving project applications
or rezones. In no case were they purporting to act as a court or were
the processes similar to formal adjudications.
The appearance of fairness doctrine was the court's blunt
instrument invalidating any decision tinged with any sort of personal
interest, regardless of the context or the degree of the interest, factors
which the U.S. Supreme Court has also considered in applying the
constitutional due process standard. In two early cases, the seminal
Smith case and again in the Chrobuck case, the court invalidated
decisions on the grounds of illegal spot zoning, while developing its
appearance of fairness doctrine and finding violations of it as well.' 84
In Buell, there was personal interest because of nearby land ownership.s

In Fleming, the personal interest in future employment was

flagrant, clearly at the high end of the scale.' 86 A more indirect
employment interest in SAVE v. City of Bothell still violated the

179. 1000 Friends of Oregon, 742 P.2d at 46.
180. Id. (citing Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972); Tumey v. Ohio, 273

U.S. 510 (1927)).
181. Id. (citing Commonwealth Corp. v. Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968).
182. Id. (citing Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973)).
183. Id. (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)).
184. Chrobuck, 78 Wash. 2d at 871-72, 480 P.2d at 497-98; Smith, 75 Wash. 2d at 745, 453
P.2d at 849.
185. Buell, 80 Wash. 2d at 525, 495 P.2d at 1362-63.
186. Fleming, 81 Wash. 2d at 299-300, 502 P.2d at 331-32. The personal interest in future
employment with a party was similar in Chicago, Milwaukee, St. P. & Pac. R.R. v. Washington
State Human Rights Comm'n, 87 Wash. 2d 802, 557 P.2d 303 (1976), but the court decided the
case on other grounds.
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appearance of fairness doctrine. 7 The personal interests in Swift
and Narrowsview were indirect, probably more like generic self-interest,
but the decisions were still invalidated on appearance grounds."'
Had the constitutional due process standard been applied instead,
it is arguable that only the Fleming case would have exhibited the level
of personal interest sufficient to violate the actual fairness requirement
for the decision proceeding. In the other cases, indirect connections,
such as employment by an organization that only possibly might
benefit financially from the decision, are more like the generic selfinterest that falls at the low end of the personal interest scale. Thus,
in the heyday of the Washington court's invalidation of local land use
decisions under the appearance of fairness doctrine, a due process
standard probably would not have resulted in the same holdings in
most cases.
A second question is whether the addition of the Post test changes
the appearance of fairness doctrine sufficiently to reduce it from
standing on mere appearances alone to virtual congruity with actual
unfairness. According to the Post court, "without evidence of actual
or potential bias, an appearance of fairness claim cannot succeed and
is without merit."' 8 9 It is curious that a major amendment to this
doctrine would first appear in a criminal appeal, albeit on a challenge
of bias in the presentencing report writer. 90 The actual doctrinal
change was pure dictum, but was fully reaffirmed in OPAL.'9 ' In
Post, the court noted that
[o]ur decision here does not overrule [the Smith] line of decisions,
but reformulates the threshold that must be met before the doctrine
will be applied: evidence of a judge's or decisionmaker's actual or
potential bias. This enhanced threshold requirement is more closely
related to the evil which the doctrine is designed to prevent. 9 '
Evidence of actual or potential bias, whether or not convincing
enough to win on the merits, shifts the focus away from the reasonable,

187. SAVE v. City of Bothell, 89 Wash. 2d 862, 874, 576 P.2d 401, 408 (1978).
188. Swift, 87 Wash. 2d at 361-62, 552 P.2d at 183-84; see also Narrowsview Preservation
Ass'n v. City of Tacoma, 84 Wash. 2d 416, 420-21, 526 P.2d 897, 900-01 (1974). Perhaps the
broadest interpretation of personal interest was the invalidation of a decision by a county quasijudicial board solely because two members were married to each other; Fleck v. King County, 16
Wash. App. 668, 672-73, 558 P.2d 254, 257-58 (1977).
189. State v. Post, 118 Wash. 2d 596, 619, 826 P.2d 172, 185, amended, 837 P.2d 599
(1992).
190. Id. at 617-18, 826 P.2d at 184-85.
191. OPAL, 128 Wash. 2d at 890, 913 P.2d at 805.
192. Post, 118 Wash. 2d at 619 n.9, 826 P.2d at 185 n.9.
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disinterested observer to the behavior of the decision maker. If such
evidence can be produced to get into and stay in court, the challenge
will not be based on appearances alone. Precisely the same threshold
test must be satisfied for a claim of bias under a due process standard.
It might be possible to pass the threshold test with evidence of actual
or potential bias that was weak enough to necessitate winning only on
appearance of fairness grounds, but such an admixture would certainly
be the exception. In theory, then, the court has redefined the doctrine
without renouncing or renaming it.
In OPAL, the court applied the Post test to questions of a decision
maker's prejudgment bias. 93 This threshold inquiry is helpful on
prejudgment questions because it requires objective evidence indicating
such bias through actions or statements. The appearance standard
rarely succeeded in striking a decision on prejudgment grounds.'94
It is unclear as yet whether the Post court also meant to tighten the
threshold for personal interest bias challenges. If it did, the Post test
would presumably require some evidence of actual or potential benefit
to the decision maker, not just the appearance of a connection.
Applied to Washington cases in which the court found appearance
of fairness violations, the Post test would probably have changed the
outcomes where employment connections or ownership proximity to
the property at issue were indirect or low-level, because evidence of
actual or potential benefit would be attenuated.' 95 Clear employment
conflicts like Fleming would probably still be caught in this tightened
doctrine.' 96 Thus, the addition of the Post test could well have
transformed the appearance of fairness doctrine from a blunt instrument crushing any bud of personal interest into one with more
accuracy in striking only the true problems.
Many other states apply the actual due process standard to local
land use decisions. 197 Oregon, for example, developed its due
process doctrine for land use decisions almost concurrently with

193. OPAL, 128 Wash. 2d at 890, 913 P.2d at 805; see also discussion supra, at note 62.
194. Anderson v. Island County, 81 Wash. 2d 312, 501 P.2d 594 (1972), is the only strong
statement on prejudgment. Under the appearance of fairness standard, the court was protective
of legislative independence, which was clarified in title 42, chapter 36, section 040, of the
Washington Revised Code. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.36.040 (1996).
195. See, e.g., SAVE v. City of Bothell, 89 Wash. 2d 862, 576 P.2d 401 (1978); Swift v.
Island County, 87 Wash. 2d 348, 552 P.2d 175 (1976); Narrowsview Preservation Ass'n v. City
of Tacoma, 84 Wash. 2d 416, 526 P.2d 897 (1974); Buell v. City of Bremerton, 80 Wash. 2d
518, 495 P.2d 1358 (1972).
196. Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972).
197. See, e.g., Jennie L. Pettit, Comment, Ex Parte Communications in Local Land Use
Decisions, 15 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 181, 195-204 (1987).
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Washington's appearance of fairness doctrine, but its court clearly
98
The
rejected the apparent fairness standard in its leading case.'
Oregon approach begins with a case-by-case determination of whether
the action was legislative or quasi-judicial,' 99 based on the same
criteria of area-wide or individual property rights as defined in the
Washington statute. 0 0 If legislative, the court will grant considerable
deference to the decision-making process.20 ' If quasi-judicial, the
decision making must meet due process standards, including "a
tribunal which is impartial in the matter. '20 2 The Oregon court later
clarified that the standard was actual fairness of a proceeding,0 3 and
expressly rejected the apparent fairness standard, saying, "we find no
basis in Oregon law for imposing the test of 'appearance' stated by the
Washington court in Swift." 2"
Thus, there is more than one way of achieving the goal of fairness
and public confidence in government decision making. The Washington court chose to address unacceptable local land use decision making
with the apparent fairness standard. The legislature has responded to
the need for better land use decisions with a variety of new statutes
containing many procedures and standards with which local land use
proposals must comply. The clear effect of the statutory processes
thus introduced is to make review of and decisions on proposals more
technical, more professional, and less political, and thereby less in need
of the appearance of fairness doctrine. The court has consequently
backed off from its aggressive application of the doctrine, modifying its
threshold in such a way as to align it quite closely with the constitutional due process standard. Washington's courts still play an
important role in local land use decisions, but the role mostly revolves
around ensuring compliance with the broad statutory scheme created
by the legislature in the period since 1971.

198. Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs of Washington County, 507 P.2d 23, 30 (Or.
1973).
199. Id. at 25-26.
200. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.36.010 (1996).
201. Fasano, 507 P.2d at 26.
202. Id. at 30.
203. Neuberger v. City of Portland (Neuberger II), 607 P.2d 722, 725 (Or. 1980), denying
rehearingfor Neuberger v. City of Portland (Neuberger I), 603 P.2d 771 (Or. 1979).
204. 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Wasco County Court, 742 P.2d 39, 44 (Or. 1987). The
court declared that "the price of such invalidation [on appearance standards] is delay of what, but
for appearances, is a proper application of public policy, at potentially heavy cost to an innocently
successful proponent as well as to the agency." Id. at 44.

Seattle University Law Review

V.

[Vol. 21:653

CONCLUSION

After the OPAL decision, Washington's appearance of fairness
doctrine could be characterized as a kind of legal phantom: known to
exist, but of uncertain form or visibility. The doctrine certainly exists
and is widely acknowledged and invoked. But there remains significant
ambiguity in its scope and substance, especially with continued
narrowing of its application. And there is increasing uncertainty about
whether the courts will enforce the doctrine on any conceivable set of
facts on local government decision making.
Two major explanations were offered for the current problematic
status of the doctrine. One was the introduction, since the first
announcement of the appearance of fairness doctrine, of several new
statutes which now apply to virtually all local land use decision
making. The effect of these statutes has been to create more objective
standards for review of land use proposals, more opportunities for the
public to participate in the review, and more power for professional
administrative staff and hearing examiners relative to the planning
commissions and legislative bodies which produced most of the
appearance of fairness violations. The second explanation was a
consequence of the first: the quiet judicial transformation of the
doctrine into what is in effect a due process standard for public
officials' decision making. Due process of course had always underlain
public decision making and the appearance of fairness doctrine, but the
court modified the doctrine with the Post test to focus more attention
on actual behavior of the public decision maker, thus aligning it more
closely with the due process standard. The due process standard
would not, however, have produced the same results in early cases
where appearance of fairness violations were found,"' attesting to the
unique value of the doctrine.
But has this transformation been salutary for the public decisionmaking process? Several criteria can be identified as primary objectives
for a procedural framework for decision making. First, and foremost,
the legal framework should aim to protect parties' rights in any
governmental action involving those parties, by affording them a "fair,
impartial and neutral hearing. 20 6 This is the due process guarantee
of the Fourteenth Amendment applied to state actions, aiming "to

205. This conclusion is contrary to the argument of Justice Utter in Washington Med.
Disciplinary Bd. v. Johnston, 99 Wash. 2d 466, 483-85, 663 P.2d 457, 467 (1983) (Utter, J.,

concurring).
206. Id. at 484, 663 P.2d at 467.
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prevent even the probability of unfairness." 20 7 Second, a procedural
framework should be legally consistent and well-rooted jurisprudentially, 20 implying either a constitutional basis or statutory requirements. Third, the framework should inspire "the highest public
confidence in those governmental processes. '2' 9 This is the original
rationale for development of the appearance of fairness doctrine.
Finally, the procedural framework should offer clear guidelines to
decision makers for their participation in an action. 210 The legislative/adjudicative distinction211 and the specification of bias factors212 attempt to address such guidelines, but no such prior checklist
could be exhaustive.
The statutory framework that may have supplanted the appearance
of fairness doctrine does not in and of itself support a due process
guarantee different from Fourteenth Amendment rights with respect
to any public action. Such a statutory framework is, however, by
definition well-rooted in statutory authority, and with the 1995 GMA
amendments has become more legally consistent. As for inspiring
public confidence, the statutory framework cannot in one sense match
the appearance standard of the original doctrine, but in another sense
it far surpasses the doctrine because of its greater reliance on information gathering, public access, and professional staff in place of the freewheeling judgments of politicians. And in creating clear signals to
decision makers for their behavior, no judicial doctrine can match a
consistent statutory framework of actions, timelines, and criteria that
constrain the discretion of political and professional decision makers
alike.
The appearance of fairness doctrine as modified by the Post test
has become a close approximation of the due process standard; it
contains the due process guarantee and is certainly well-rooted
jurisprudentially. It cannot match the original doctrine in the latter's
appeal to the high moral ground of public confidence, since only an
appearance standard from a disinterested observer's perspective could
do so (as with judicial standards). And the due process approximation

207. Washington Med. Disciplinary Bd., 99 Wash. 2d at 484, 663 P.2d at 467 (quoting In

re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).

208. Harris v. Hornbaker, 98 Wash. 2d 650, 668, 658 P.2d 1219, 1230 (1983) (Utter, J.,
concurring).
209. Swift v. Island County, 87 Wash. 2d 348, 361, 552 P.2d 175, 183 (1976).
210. Vache, supra note 13, at 487.
211. Westside Hilltop Survival Comm. v. King County, 96 Wash. 2d 171, 634 P.2d 862
(1981); WASH. REV. CODE § 42.36.010.
212. Buell v.City of Bremerton, 80 Wash. 2d 518, 524, 495 P.2d 1358, 1362 (1972).
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is probably not significantly different from appearance of fairness in
providing clear signals to decision makers: neither does so clearly.
However, since due process is the APA standard for review of
administrative decisions, the due process approximation for local land
use decisions creates an appealing and understandable consistency.
In the final analysis, the question of whether or not the appearance of fairness doctrine has been displaced by statutes and due process
seems almost moot because of the rapidly diminishing role for the
politician decision makers at whose free-wheeling actions the doctrine
was targeted. The flagrant facts in OPAL may never be replicated, as
hearing examiners proliferate even in small counties. In the future,
there will be many fruitful grounds for challenges to land use decisions,
but appearance of fairness is unlikely to be one of them.

